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Introduction 
 
India’s proposed new 2016 Bill1 on the regulation of surrogacy is the fourth attempt to 
respond to national and international criticism from women’s groups2 and social and 
legal theorists3 that suggest that insufficient protection is given to all parties of a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement. Ostensibly drafted to protect the surrogate mother 
and the resulting child, the series of Bills have lacked clarity and, most importantly, 
have failed to safeguard the rights of women and children.  The proposed legislation 
provides a valuable opportunity to analyse not only the legislation, but also to consider 
developments in the theoretical critique of conditions of exploitation that threaten the 
autonomy of women.   Central to these  developments has been the work of Martha 
Nussbaum and Susan Okin who have introduced the notion of  ‘adaptive preference’ 4   
                                                     
1 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016  http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-surrogacy-
regulation-bill-2016-4470/  
2 Sarojini Nadimpally, Sneha Banerjee, and Deepa Venkatachalam, Sama Resource Group for 
Women and Health, ‘Commercial Surrogacy: A Contested Terrain in the Realm of Rights and 
Justice’, Kuala Lumpur: Asian-Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW), 
2016 
3 See, for example, Margaret Ryznar, ‘International Commercial Surrogacy and its Parties’, John 
Marshall Law Review, 43:4 (2010) pp 1009-1040, Ruby L Lee, ‘New Trends in Global 
Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation’, Hastings Women’s Law Journal, 
Volume 20, Issue 2, (2009) pp 275 – 299, Anindita Majumdar, ‘The Rhetoric of Choice: The 
Feminist Debates on Reproductive Choice in the Commercial Surrogacy Arrangement in India’, 
Gender, Technology and Development, 18(2), (2014), 275-301 
4 The principal theorists of adaptive preference formation are Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human 
capabilities: female human beings’ in Women, Culture, and Development (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1995) at p. 91, Susan Okin, ‘Feminism and multiculturalism: some tensions’, Ethics 108, 4 
(1998), p. 661 in S J Khader, ‘Must theorising about adaptive preferences deny women’s 
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This refers to a decision or choice, made by  a woman living in a patriarchal and 
oppressive environment, which is held to be inconsistent with that  woman’s well-being. 
Crucial to the account is the presumption that the adaptive preference signifies a deficit 
in autonomy. These two presumptions thus imply that the ‘adaptive preference’ in 
question signifies exploitation. There is no doubt that patriarchal oppression does 
influence the decision-making of women living under such conditions, and there is no 
doubt that patriarchy seeks to exploit women by the influence exerted upon them. But 
are all preferences expressed under oppressive conditions rightly to be regarded as 
‘adaptive preferences’ in the sense that they imply an absence of autonomy on the part 
of the choice maker? In following Serene Khader’s valuable work in this area this 
article seeks to question this assumption.5  
 
Some decisions might reasonably be hypothesised as ‘adaptive preferences’ as defined 
by Nussbaum and Okin,  but the application of a more imaginative understanding of the  
complexity of the relationship between autonomy and exploitation – and of the 
environments in which it strives to express itself – can  render different conclusions 
about its presence or absence. This is because explanatory theory in general must 
                                                                                                                                                           
agency?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy: Journal of the Society for Applied Philosophy Vol. 29 
Issue 4 (2012) p. 302 and A. Sen, Rationality and Freedom, (Belknap, Cambridge 2002), in 
Serene J Khader, ‘Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy’, Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for People-Centered Development 
10:2 (2009), p.169 
5 Serene Khader, Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment, (Oxford University Press 
2011), 54 
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acknowledge, and attempt to account for, complex contextual motivations behind 
decisions, in circumstances where social, cultural and economic influences are 
overwhelmingly varied and uncertain.  What Khader’s account of autonomy  seeks to 
demonstrate, however, is that a particular decision under scrutiny (e.g, the choice to act 
as a commercial surrogate) may be deemed to be an autonomous choice of action even if 
it is also simultaneously the case that the decision-maker is a victim of exploitation in 
respect of the decision made.  
 
In pursuing this theoretical point, the first section of this article considers the various 
issues related to regulation and, supposedly, the protection, of surrogates that have 
emerged in the four draft Bills, (2008, 2010, 2014, and especially the latest and most 
restrictive legislation of 2016), that have been proposed since India has attracted global 
interest as a centre for commercial surrogacy.  In light of this, the second section 
explains what is meant by autonomy and why it holds such an important place in 
medical decision-making in particular. The possibility of ‘adaptive preference’ 
formation is examined and the epistemological difficulties surrounding the in-principle 
identification of instances of adaptive preference are discussed: identifying an 
individual’s choice of action as an ‘adaptive preference’ denies the autonomy of that 
individual.  But whilst the notion of instances of ‘adaptive preference’ is logically 
coherent, and empirically and historically plausible and likely, so too are choices of 
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action which are better understood as  trade-offs or ways of flourishing which are not 
immediately familiar to different cultures operating with less flexible criteria and 
convictions about freedom and choice.  Rather than assuming that certain preferences 
have been ‘adapted’ and thus forfeit autonomy, theory should look to characterize 
choice phenomena more imaginatively.  This might be achieved by asking which 
theoretical perspective offers the best critical account of the ways in which the notion of 
autonomy survives in circumstances that, empirically, suggest the complete 
internalisation of oppression.  
 
The concluding section acknowledges that despite the problems inherent in applying 
autonomy theory to practical-empirical situations, its value lies in demonstrating that 
autonomy can survive and be coherently imputed to empirical choice makers, even in 
circumstances where individuals must make decisions within an environment of 
constrained choice.  Where there is an imbalance of bargaining-power, insufficient 
provision of information, and a lack of protection provided by the state for the surrogate 
mother, then these conditions promote and encourage exploitation, and erode autonomy 
in equal measure. But exploitative conditions do not annihilate autonomy.  A critique of 
legislation informed by this understanding of the complex relationship between 
autonomy and oppression can accept that surrogacy might, in some circumstances, be 
an autonomous choice. Nevertheless, explaining the theoretical survival of autonomy in 
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the face of oppression and exploitation does not alter the fact that the promotion and 
flourishing of the autonomy of women demands the eradication of exploitation.  It is 
submitted that the 2016 Surrogacy Bill is a missed opportunity to introduce safeguards 
that genuinely protect those who are fundamental to the practice and help to promote 
and nurture autonomy.  
 
India’s legislation on commercial surrogacy 
 
The Indian Government’s Union Cabinet has recently given its approval for the 
introduction of the draft Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016.6 The government has 
outlined its intentions to establish a central level National Surrogacy Board, State 
Surrogacy Boards and Appropriate Authorities in the State and Union Territories.7   The 
principal aims of the legislation will be to regulate surrogacy, to protect the rights of the 
surrogate mother and the children born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement, to 
                                                     
6 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016  http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-surrogacy-
regulation-bill-2016-4470/ The Parliamentary Standing Committee submitted its report on the 
Bill in August 2017 outlining its observations and recommendations.  The Bill’s status is still 
listed as Pending and there is no indication as yet when or whether it will be passed.  Standing 
Committee Report Summary, August 25, 2017. www.prsindia.org  
7 This is in response to the Law Commission of India’s 228th Report ‘Need for Legislation to 
Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as well as Rights and Obligations of Parties 
to a Surrogacy’ (Report No. 228), August 2009    
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report228.pdf  
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prohibit commercial surrogacy and to allow altruistic surrogacy for Indian married 
couples who are infertile.8   
 
Although this would be welcomed by those who believe that the lack of regulation has 
resulted in exploitation of Indian women and uncertainty as to the status of the children 
born from surrogacy arrangements, criticisms of the proposals remain.  There is also 
scepticism as to whether this Bill will reach enactment given that similar attempts at 
legislation proposed in 20089, 201010 and 201411, still remain tabled as Drafts.  The four 
Bills have displayed differences in focus and aims and all have met obstacles when 
exposed to the scrutiny of various ministries.12 A brief summary of the debate from 
2008 will thus be useful here. 
 
The 2008 Bill proposed to make Assisted Reproduction Techniques (ARTs) available to 
single persons, married couples and unmarried couples.  ‘Couples’ were defined in 
gender neutral fashion as ‘persons’ who lived together and were in a sexual relationship 
that was legal in their country of residence or citizenship. Although this would have 
                                                     
8 The States of Jammu and Kashmir are to be excluded from the Bill.  
9 The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill and Rules 2008. This was presented 
by the Indian Council of Medical Research.  
10 The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 2010 
11 The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 2014 
12 Priyattama Bhanj, ‘The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2010: A Case 
of Misplaced Priorities?’, JILS Blog, 17 July, 2014. Available at 
https://jilsblognujs.wordpress.com/2014/07/17/the-assisted-reproductive-technologies-
regulation-bill-2010-a-case-of-misplaced-priorities/  Accessed 27 February, 2017.  
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excluded non-heterosexual couples in India, the fact that the 2008 Bill allowed 
foreigners to access ART services meant that non-heterosexual couples, from countries 
where such a relationship was legally recognised, could have accessed ART services in 
India.13  This is the first indication of discrimination against same sex couples in India. 
As well as attracting criticism for lack of clarity and ambiguity, the resource group 
SAMA, considered the Bill to be retrograde in that it reinforced patriarchal values and 
promoted the interests of those who were providing ARTs rather than the rights of 
women and children. 14  SAMA expressed concerns relating to the lack of clarity in the 
2008 draft ART Bill and the use of ambiguous language.  Most importantly, risks to the 
woman were downplayed: ‘It is appalling how the MOHFW/ICMR have described life-
threatening risks as ‘small risks’.’15  In its recommendations SAMA states: 
 
                                                     
13 http://phrh.law.ox.ac.uk/regulating-assisted-reprodutive-technologies-in-india/ Nehaa 
Chaudhari, ‘Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies in India’, Oxford Human Rights 
Hub, 12 November 2015 
14 SAMA Team, Welcome Kit for Parliamentarians: Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs), 
Centre for Legislative Research and Advocacy, July 2009. Available at www.clraindia.org 
Accessed 27 February, 2017. SAMA Resource Group for Women and Health is an organisation 
based in Delhi which focuses on issues of women’s rights and health.  Also see 
www.samawomenshealth.in for several articles on surrogacy and reproductive rights.  
15 Serious risks to the surrogate mother were not reflected in the Bill, where the risks were 
described as ‘small risks’and risks to the potential offspring were not mentioned at all. Rules 
6.13. 
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The Draft Bill in its present form is completely unacceptable, and there is an 
urgent need for regulation of present practices of ARTs, NOT regularization and 
promotion, which seem to be its main thrust in the current form.16   
 
 
The document goes on: 
 
The Draft Bill must ensure that the commissioning parents understand and agree 
to the fact that the surrogate has a right to physical integrity and bodily 
autonomy, i.e. she cannot be forced to abort the foetus, go through foetal 
reduction or made to follow a certain diet.17 
  
In endorsing these criticisms Alison Bailey said, 
 
The draft bill does not have much to say about surrogacy work beyond 
recommending a basic set of guidelines for selecting surrogates.  .... No evidence 
exists that the health and well-being of surrogates is taken into consideration, 
except in relation to the pregnancy. 18 
                                                     
16 SAMA, ‘Welcome Kit’ p. 4 
17 SAMA, ‘Welcome Kit’ p.4   
18 Alison Bailey, ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian 
Surrogacy’, Hypatia Volume 26, Issue 4, (Fall 2011), pp 715-741. Available at 
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The 2010 Bill similarly allowed for parents, couples or individuals to be able to use 
ART services.  However, although ‘couple’ was again defined in a gender neutral way 
as ‘two persons in a sexual relationship and living together’19 this Bill required the 
sexual relationship to be legal in India which meant that all homosexual couples, Indian 
or otherwise, would be refused access to services.20 Thus discrimination against 
homosexual couples increased and, although the Bill claimed to protect the interests of 
the surrogate mother, no further measures were considered.21 
 
The 2014 Bill was more wide-ranging. Its intention was to establish a National Board 
for Assisted Reproductive Technology, with a view to developing new policies in the 
area of ART, and to assist State Boards in accrediting and regulating services of ART 
Clinics and Banks. This included provisions on rights and duties in relation to 
surrogacy, and in particular the prohibition of commercial surrogacy.22  Surrogacy for 
foreigners was not to be permitted but would be allowed for Overseas Citizens of India, 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libaccess.hud.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01168.x/full 
Accessed 27 February. 
19 The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 s 2(h) 
20 The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 s 2(h) 
21 Priyattama Bhanj, ‘The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2010: A Case 
of Misplaced Priorities?’, JILS Blog, 17 July, 2014. Available at 
https://jilsblognujs.wordpress.com/2014/07/17/the-assisted-reproductive-technologies-
regulation-bill-2010-a-case-of-misplaced-priorities/  Accessed 27 February, 2017.  
22 ‘India: Draft Legislation Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technology Published’ Law 
Library, Library of Congress, 2 November 2015. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/india-draft-legislation-regulating-assisted-reproductive-technology-published/ 
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People of Indian Origin, Non-Resident Indians and Foreign Nationals married to Indian 
citizens.23  A qualifying right included the requirement of a subsisting marriage of at 
least two years.24  In addition a certificate confirming that the woman was unable to 
conceive her own child would have to be submitted.25  A surrogacy agreement would be 
binding on the parties such that a commissioning couple26 would have to accept the 
custody of the child27 and the surrogate would relinquish all parental rights over the 
child.28  One departure from previous versions of the Bill was that services would only 
be available to infertile married couples, excluding single persons and unmarried 
couples.29 
 
In 2015 the government issued a strong statement to the Supreme Court and made 
reference to its 2014 Bill which set out its intentions to limit the scope of surrogacy to 
altruistic surrogacy to Indian married infertile couples and to prohibit commercial 
                                                     
23 Draft Bill 2014, Clause 60(11)(a) 
24 Clause 60(21)(a)(i) 
25 Clause 60(21)(a)(ii) 
26 The term ‘commissioning couple’ fits with the contractual nature of the practice of surrogacy in 
India but is also sometimes used in the U.K.  The term ‘intended parents’ is preferred by 
surrogates in the U.K.  
27 Clause 60(11)(b) 
28 Clause 60(4) 
29 http://phrh.law.ox.ac.uk/regulating-assisted-reprodutive-technologies-in-india/ Nehaa 
Chaudhari, ‘Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies in India’, Oxford Human Rights 
Hub, 12 November 2015 
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surrogacy services.30 This was in response to several high profile cases which had 
demonstrated that there were serious problems inherent in the provision of surrogacy 
services. One such case was the Baby Manji case. Here, a Japanese couple who had 
entered into a surrogacy contract with an Indian woman, divorced prior to the child’s 
birth.  The wife did not wish to raise the child, leaving doubts as to the child’s 
nationality and identity.  The dearth of surrogacy regulations provided no legal 
clarification and these deficiencies provoked intense media debate.31 Not only did this 
have ramifications for international relations, it also led to the suspension of commercial 
surrogacy for foreign couples32 and restrictions for Indian couples.  In light of this, the 
latest Bill goes further.   
 
The 2016 Bill is the most restrictive proposed Indian legislation on surrogacy to date: 
The commissioning couple must be between 23-50 years for a female and 26-55 years 
for a male.33  The couple must have been legally married for at least five years and 
                                                     
30 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/govt-to-make-commercial-surrogacy-
illegal-panel-to-decide-on-cases-of-infertile-couples/ ‘No commercial surrogacy, only for needy 
Indian couples, Govt tells SC’, Indian Express, 25 December 2015 
31 Baby Manji Yamada vs Union of India & Anr. (2008) INSC 1656 (29 September 2008). 
Judgment in the Supreme Court of India Civil Original Jurisdiction Writ Petition (C) No. 369 of 
2008. http://www.commonlii.org/in/cases/INSC/2008/1656.html  The definitions of family and 
citizenship under Indian and Japanese law could not provide a decisive answer as to the 
parentage and nationality of the baby in this case.  Kari Points, ‘Commercial Surrogacy and 
Fertility Tourism in India’, The Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University, 
https://web.duke.edu/kenanethics/casestudies/babymanji.pdf  accessed 20 September 2016 
32 The Union Home Ministry instructed Indian Missions and Foreigner Regional Registration 
Offices (FRRO) not to grant visas to couples intending to visit India for surrogacy.  
33 Bill No. 257 of 2016, Clause 4 (iii)(c)(I). 
12 
 
should be Indian citizens.34  They must not have a surviving biological child, an adopted 
child or a child from a previous surrogacy, unless the child in question is mentally or 
physically challenged or suffers from a life threatening disorder with no permanent 
cure.35 At least one of the couple must have proven infertility.36   There will be a 
provision which ensures that the commissioning couple would not be able to abandon 
the child born through surrogacy.37  The surrogate (who will be an altruistic surrogate) 
must be a close relative of the commissioning couple and can only act as a surrogate 
once.38 The Bill again prohibits commercial surrogacy and does not allow homosexual 
couples, single parents, or couples who are merely living together, to have access to 
surrogacy.  
 
This protects the surrogate only to the extent that it takes the option for surrogacy away 
from her. Customers from overseas pay significant fees for the service, albeit less than 
they would have to pay elsewhere.39 The ban on commercial surrogacy would thus 
deprive women of potential economic benefits.40  Article 21 of the Constitution of India 
                                                     
34 Clause 4(iii)(c)(II) 
35 Clause 4(iii)(c)(III) 
36 Clause 4(iii)(a)(I) 
37 Clause 7  
38 Clause 4(iii)(b)(II) 
39 http://www.businessinsider.com/india-surrogate-mother-industry-2013-9 Nita Bhalla and 
Mansi Thapliyal, ‘Foreigners are Flocking to India to Rent Wombs and Grow Surrogate Babies’, 
Business Insider (2013) 
40  Izabela Jargilo, ‘Regulating the trade of commercial surrogacy in India’, Journal of 
International Business and Law 15 (2015-2016), p. 354 
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lists the fundamental right to protection of life and personal liberty and this could be 
interpreted to include a right to choose to earn a livelihood through surrogacy.41 
 
The demand for surrogacy will always be high in India itself, a country which expects a 
woman to produce an heir and where there is stigma attached to adoption.42  Some will 
only respect a wife if she is the mother of a child, which not only proves her husband’s 
virility but also enables the family line to be continued.43  Many women who are 
infertile are ostracized and some even at risk of domestic violence and abandonment.44 
Given this societal focus on producing a child, the insistence that the surrogate can only 
be a close relative of the commissioning parents has led to concerns that young women 
will then be coerced by family members to assist sisters-in-law who are unable to 
conceive or carry a child.45  In addition, given that the commissioning couple and the 
surrogate will be living in close proximity to each other, there is the potential for the 
                                                     
 41 The Constitution of India (1950) Art. 21. https://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-
india/constitution-india-full-text   See also  http://thewire.in/64656/why-the-government-needs-
to-rethink-the-surrogacy-bill/ Chithra P. George, ‘The Government Must Rethink the Surrogacy 
Bill’, The Wire, 8th September, 2016 
42 http://www.feminisminindia.com/2016/08/31/critical-analysis-surrogacy-regulation-bill-
2016/#.V9un8fkrKUk Malavika Ravi, ‘A Critical Analysis of The Surrogacy Regulation Bill 2016’. 
43 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762401 Smith Chandra, ‘Surrogacy and India’, Social Science 
Research Network, 16 February 2011   
44 Anne Donchin, ‘Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender Justice’, Bioethics 
Volume 24 Number 7 (2010), pp 323-332 
45 http://thewire.in/64656/why-the-government-needs-to-rethink-the-surrogacy-bill/ Chithra P. 
George, ‘The Government Must Rethink the Surrogacy Bill’, The Wire, 8th September, 2016.  
The Standing Committee’s Report, published in August, also refers to potential psychological 
effects on the surrogate child, should a close relative be compelled to act as a surrogate. 
Standing Committee Report Summary, August 25, 2017. www.prsindia.org  
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surrogate and the baby to bond and as a consequence it is likely that the surrogate will 
be deprived of her privacy in order to avoid this.46  This would violate the surrogate’s 
right to health and bodily integrity as a facet of ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India.47  
 
Enactment and implementation of the 2016 Bill is not certain.48 There are many with a 
vested interest in the continuation of commercial surrogacy. The current 
commercialisation of surrogacy in India is thought to be worth between US $450-500 
million.49  It is, therefore, lucrative, not only for the medical profession but also for 
those women who would not otherwise be able to access the level of income that acting 
as a surrogate provides. India legalized commercial surrogacy in 2002 and this led to the 
country becoming one of the most popular destinations for reproductive tourism, 
providing a much cheaper and less bureaucratic access to surrogacy for couples from 
                                                     
46 http://thewire.in/64656/why-the-government-needs-to-rethink-the-surrogacy-bill/ Chithra P. 
George, ‘The Government Must Rethink the Surrogacy Bill’, The Wire, 8th September, 2016 
47 Article 21 Constitution of India (1950). Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
48 The Parliamentary Standing Committee submitted its report in August 2017 and 
recommended a compensation model of surrogacy rather than an altruistic one, also expressing 
concerns as to the requirement that the surrogate should be a close relative, the five year 
waiting period and the lack of clarity regarding egg or sperm donation.  It also recommended 
that the criteria for eligibility be widened to include live-in couples, divorced women and widows.  
www.prsindia.org  
49 Prabha Raghavan & Divya Rajagopal, ‘Double Whammy: What the surrogacy bill brings for 
India’, The Economic Times 3 September 2016. 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/double-whammy-what-the-surrgacy-
bill-brings-for-ndia/articleshow/53987298.cms?prtpage=1  
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many different countries.50  India has been particularly attractive for surrogacy as there 
is no risk of the surrogate mother being regarded as the legal parent, the contract making 
it clear that the commissioning couple are the legal parents of the resulting child.51  The 
practice is unregulated, with little evidence of whether many infertility clinics adhere to 
the voluntary guidelines published by the Indian Medical Council, which have not been 
implemented into law.52 There are reports of malpractice at some of the clinics.53 There 
is little information available on how many ART clinics are in existence, and no 
information available on the babies which have been produced using ART. 
 
As noted, there are doubts as to whether the legislation would be enforced.  Similarly 
strong feelings were evidenced about sex-selective abortion and there is clear legislation 
banning sex determination for non-medical reasons54 leading to sex-selective abortion55 
but data indicates that the practice is still common.56  As with surrogacy, many benefit 
                                                     
50 Possibly the main destination. ‘India: Draft Legislation Regulating Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Published’ Law Library, Library of Congress, 2 November 2015, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/india-draft-legislation-regulating-assisted-
reproductive-technology-published/  
51 Jargilo, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India’, p. 343 
52 http://icmr.nic.in/art/art_clinics.htm Indian Council of Medical Research and National Academy 
of Medical Sciences, India, National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of 
ART Clinics in India (2005) 
53 Jargilo, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India’, p.343 
54 Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment Act 
2002. 
55 In India abortion was legalised in 1971 by the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 
legislation which was very similar to the U.K.’s 1967 Act. Sex selection is not included in the 
grounds permitted for abortion.  
56 Prof Prabhat Jha, Maya A Kesler, Prof Rajesh Kumar, Prof Faujdar Ram, Usha Ram, Lukasz 
Aleksandrowicz, Diego G Bassani, Shailaja Changra, Jayant K Banthia, ‘Trends in selective 
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financially from the practice of sex-selective abortion and this seems to take priority 
over observance of a clear prohibition. It seems that there has to be a belief in India that 
the legislation will benefit the individual in order for it to be adhered to.   
  
If the Bill proceeds to legislation there is fear that commercial surrogacy will be driven 
underground and that women may be trafficked to other jurisdictions where surrogacy is 
permitted.57  There is also the possibility that agreements with commissioning couples 
from overseas will continue despite the ban, the couples willing to take the risk of 
entering into a contract.  Clinics and doctors who have also become used to the high 
levels of income will be unwilling to forfeit such opportunities.  It may be that the 
demand and supply will remain unchanged; it will merely be the access to such services 
which will vary.  As a consequence, women who act as surrogates will be even less 
protected and more exposed to potential harm. Desperation on both sides will override 
any prohibition. The proposed Bill does not protect the commercial surrogate and in fact 
creates a more exploitative environment. 
 
As the proposed ban on commercial surrogacy appears to be a reaction to concerns 
about exploitation, based upon fears that women are not making the choice 
                                                                                                                                                           
abortions of girls in India: analysis of nationally representative birth histories from 1990 to 2005 
and census data from 1991 to 2011’, The Lancet, Volume 377 Issue 9781, (2011) p. 1921 
57 http://thewire.in/64656/why-the-government-needs-to-rethink-the-surrogacy-bill/ Chithra P. 
George, ‘The Government Must Rethink the Surrogacy Bill’, The Wire, 8 September 2016 
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autonomously but may be making what Nussbaum and Okin refer to as ‘adaptive 
preferences’, the following section examines in more detail the concept of ‘adaptive 
preference’ formation and how we might develop the critique of autonomy. 
 
Adaptive preference formation and the presumption of autonomy deficit 
 
To act autonomously is to be the author of one’s own decisions and choices.58 
Autonomous decisions and choices are assumed to be the products of beliefs and values 
arrived at, and held, freely – not imposed on us from without.  Autonomy plays a central 
role in the sphere of bioethics and is usually evidenced by the provision of a valid 
consent to medical treatment which lends moral legitimacy and legality to treatment.  
Thus a person’s autonomy will be respected if the individual has capacity, has been 
provided with, and has understood, sufficient information about the treatment, and if the 
decision is made voluntarily. But a valid consent (or refusal) is only evidence of 
autonomy and if an irrational or ill-advised decision is made then further scrutiny of a 
decision will be triggered to better determine the presence or otherwise of autonomy.   
In the context of a person living under gender and social oppression, where a decision is 
perceived to be inconsistent with the woman’s well-being and is made under conditions 
which are inconsistent with her flourishing, then there may be a reasonable intuition that 
                                                     
58 Beauchamp and McCullough describe the concept as having sovereignty over one’s life. T L 
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the woman has internalised her oppression.  The presumption will be that this has 
caused her to adapt her preference, negating her autonomy.   
 
In the case of an Indian woman choosing to act as a commercial surrogate her decision 
could be considered to be against her wellbeing because it results in separation from her 
family, risks her health and means that she is treated as a means to an end, a cheap 
source of labour.59  If cross-cultural judgments are made about her flourishing the 
assumption will be that she cannot be in control of her own decision-making.  
 
However, it is difficult to understand the surrogate’s desires from her behaviour and 
ways in which she may flourish will be unfamiliar.   There could be other reasons for 
her choice other than an internalisation of oppression and it may be possible that the 
woman choosing to act as a surrogate does possess agency and autonomy.  Although 
this alternative intuition may challenge the popular view of the Indian surrogate as an 
exploited victim it does recognise that the woman may have her own reasons for 
making the decision which are not solely built upon her society’s views of her sex.  
Certainly choice environment is limited by culture, and the woman will optimise her 
position within those choice constraints, but she may yet be acting autonomously. This 
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recognition then empowers her as it does not label her as a defective agent and serves to 
promote her autonomy. 
 
The danger of one intuition is that too much is assumed from the environment of 
oppression, but the other intuition may not acknowledge the extent of the internalisation 
of oppression. Both approaches aim to improve the lives of women yet both could be 
detrimental to their wellbeing.60  The key is to achieve the correct balance between the 
two: to recognise that a decision which may appear to be representative of the woman’s 
own values could in fact be a product of her internalising social oppression and so not 
her own, yet not making that assumption automatically because of the content of her 
decision. Further scrutiny of the decision, and her reasons for acting, is required.  
Western women’s feminist presumptions will not serve Indian surrogate mothers’ best 
interests and claims as to the presence or otherwise of autonomy must be based on more 
rigorous examination of why this choice is being made and the extent of external and 
internal influences.  As Deomampo reasons, to regard Third World women merely as 
                                                     
60 See Diana Tietjens Meyers, ‘The Feminist Debate over Values in Autonomy Theory’, in 
Andrea Veltman and and Mark Piper, eds., Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender ((Oxford 
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the helpless and oppressed who need to be rescued labels them as victims but does not 
acknowledge that these are individuals with their own perspective and reasoning.61 
 
The first intuition is a possibility if there is a total internalisation of her society’s views 
of her sex and those are the sole reason for her preference.  This has been described as a 
paradigmatic adaptive preference62 and would mean that the woman is not choosing 
autonomously.  Socialisation can have a subtle effect on the ability of women to act 
autonomously63 and could be so internalised that a woman may genuinely believe that 
her reasons for acting are her own.64  The socialisation may be deemed oppressive 
because what the woman is made to think and believe is not true.  She may have been 
led to internalise false ideas and so does not understand her reasons for making certain 
decisions. The woman in India is regarded by some as an economic liability and a 
burden to her family as a dowry has to be paid on her marriage and sometimes 
continuing payments made to the groom’s family to ensure her wellbeing and 
respectability.  Marriages are often arranged to produce alliances between groups or the 
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woman may be sold as a bride to produce male heirs. She is therefore accustomed to 
being considered as a means to an end, something to be used to further others’ purposes.  
She may consequently possess a low status and this will influence how she regards 
herself and her own worth.   If she is pressurised by her family to act as a surrogate to 
provide an income for her family then she is unlikely to refuse or even to question that 
path.   
 
However, if there is no total internalisation of oppression, the decision is still intuitively 
problematic because it appears to be causally related to unjust conditions.   Further 
scrutiny of the decision is thus required to determine the option set the woman is 
working within and how she perceives her choices.  There are different types of 
adaptive preferences and it may be that the woman is finding her own way of 
negotiating her environment. There are also external conditions which will affect her 
decision-making.  Traditionally many women in India have limited earning power, they 
have little education but will need to add to the sparse income of their husbands so that 
their children may have the chance of an education or perhaps improved living 
conditions.65  There are thus structures of inequality and social subordination which 
affect many women and these influences will feed into her decision-making.66 
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Serene Khader uses her Deliberative Perfectionist Conception of Adaptive Preference to 
identify those preferences of concern, where there is a suspicion of an absence of 
autonomy.  Her definition of an adaptive preference requires a choice to be inconsistent 
with basic flourishing, formed under conditions which are not conducive to basic 
flourishing, and which it is believed could be changed following normative scrutiny and 
exposure to conditions which are more conducive to flourishing.67  
 
The preference to act as a commercial surrogate can be considered to be contrary to the 
woman’s welfare, certainly, as she is in effect selling the use of her body and is being 
used as a means to an end.  The preference is also causally related to the conditions of 
oppression which have formed it as she is then regarded as the baby maker which can 
produce the all-important child, essential to the Indian family. In addition she is a 
source of income for the family and the medical profession who provide surrogacy 
services.  The preference may have been developed in response to unjust social 
arrangements and it is incompatible with her basic wellbeing. However, this will merely 
trigger suspicion as to whether she is making her own choice but would not necessarily 
deny the agency of the decision-maker. 
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The woman could have a degree of normative distortion but not total.  She may have a 
critical perspective of her situation and the decision she is making within a limited 
choice environment.68  Ramya, a surrogate mother interviewed in Amrita Pande’s study 
of Indian surrogates, recognises that the practice of surrogacy is regarded by some as 
wrong, but attempts to justify her involvement, describing it as a good opportunity for 
her and others.  
  
Women in our country will continue to do this, whether the government likes it 
or not, whether you like it or not!  This is the best option available for many of 
us.  If the government declares this to be a bad thing, we will do this in hiding, 
like prisoners, ashamed and weeping over our misfortune.69 
 
Another surrogate, Salma, also recognises the dubious ethics of the practice, but states 
that for many there is no choice. 
 
                                                     
68 Uma Narayan, Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices, and Other 
Women’, in Louise M Antony and Charlotte E Witt eds., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays 
on Reason and Objectivity, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2002) in Serene J Khader, 
‘Identifying adaptive preferences in practice: lessons from postcolonial feminisms’, Journal of 
Global Ethics, 9:3, (2013), p 311 
69 Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2014), pp 180-181 
  
24 
 
This work is not ethical – it’s just something we have to do to survive.  .... 
society disapproves.  But I say, if your family is starving what will you do with 
respect?  Prestige won’t fill an empty stomach.70  
 
Her words also indicate that she has been forced to execute a trade-off, with the 
awareness that she will only be able to achieve a certain level of welfare.  She strives to 
maximise her security and increase her life choices.  This is again illustrated in 
Yashoda’s account where she explains that acting as a surrogate takes her away from 
the harsh treatment from her mother-in-law and grants her some independence. 
 
This is the first time that I am not giving up all my income to my mother-in-law.  
Whatever I earned as a maid I had to surrender to her and she would decide how 
much spending money my children and I would get every month.  This is the 
first time I get to keep all of it with me.  I get to decide what I want to do with it.  
I know this money is not enough for everything, I know I will go back to being a 
maid.  But as long as it gets me out of that house – I think all this will be worth 
it.71 
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Alternatively the Indian surrogate may be lacking non-normative information.  She may 
not be aware of other choices or any benefits she may gain in refusing to make the 
choice. She may not be informed of the risks involved to her own health.72  In the case 
of commercial surrogacy it is doubted that the surrogate will fully understand the terms 
of the contract she is signing and any rights she may have. In some cases it is the 
husband’s signature which is used to finalise the contract. Again, this is demonstrated in 
the individual narratives in Pande’s study.  These are the words of Panna, a 27 year old 
housewife, who was persuaded to act as a surrogate by her husband and sister-in law. 
 
I don’t know if the egg is mine or not.  I wasn’t involved in the paperwork 
either.  When the nurse was explaining everything to us, my husband was there.  
He understands more about all this and he is the one who is handling the 
money.73  
 
It may be that if she was made aware of the terms of the contract she would not have 
made the same decision.  So it is an adaptive preference based on limited information. 
But there is a significant difference between being non-autonomous on the one hand, 
and on the other not being fully informed.  A consent to treatment may be invalid if 
                                                     
72 As evidenced in the case studies carried out by Jargilo in Izabela Jargilo, ‘Regulating the 
trade of commercial surrogacy in India’ Journal of International Business & Law 15 (2015-2016), 
at p 349 
73 Pande, Wombs, p. 54 
 
26 
 
insufficient information regarding the nature of the procedure is provided, but the 
individual may yet be autonomous.    
 
These would all, prima facie, appear to be adaptive preferences which some would then 
claim results in autonomy deficit.  However, if Khader’s perfectionist conception of 
adaptive preference is applied, then there is a suspicion of an adaptive preference but 
autonomy or its absence of autonomy remains to be determined. We can attempt to 
settle this by applying different theories of autonomy.  Traditional procedural and 
substantive theories are applied here but also the re-conceptualised versions of these: 
relational autonomy theories.  The latter acknowledges that individuals are socially 
embedded and that social relations and conditions will influence the capacities of an 
agent. They may better take into account the possible internalisation of oppression but 
at the same time these theories aim to grant autonomy to women where internalisation is 
less than total.    
 
The application of different theories of autonomy to the decision to act as a commercial 
surrogate in India  
 
Traditional procedural theories of autonomy are content-neutral in that the actual 
content of a person’s desires and values is viewed as irrelevant.  What is required is that 
27 
 
the individual has the capacity to reflect on her motivational structure and is then able to 
change it in response to the reflection.   The structural approach is advocated by the 
models of Gerald Dworkin74 and Harry Frankfurt.75 Dworkin would describe a person 
as autonomous where there is “authenticity”, which is where the individual identifies at 
a higher level with her lower level desires, and where there is procedural independence 
of this identification.76  Frankfurt’s description is similar, although he emphasises the 
requirement that ‘first’ and ‘second order’ desires or volitions be in agreement. To be 
considered autonomous the individual must exercise control over her will, and also 
identify with her will at the level of her second order desires.  There will be 
identification following reflection, where the person distinguishes between desires she 
regards as her own and those she has but to which she is indifferent.  The problem then 
is how to ensure that the higher order identifications are autonomous give that there is a 
clear problem of a possible ‘constant regress’.77  There would always be the doubt as to 
whether the higher order desire (which endorses the lower order desire), is in itself 
autonomous, or whether endorsement by yet another level of desire is required.78 This 
would be particularly of concern in hard cases where the decision-maker is exposed to 
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gender or cultural oppression.  Frankfurt suggests that there would be no need for a 
further higher endorsement if the endorsement is made decisively and without 
reservation79, or if the person is satisfied with the higher order desire80, but this decisive 
identification, or satisfaction, could just as easily be the result of oppression.81  In 
addition, there is little guidance as to when or how a particular desire becomes one’s 
own and what properties it must have.82  There would be doubt as to whether the 
woman in India choosing to act as a commercial surrogate would have sufficient 
capacity to reflect as the majority of the surrogates are uneducated and are rarely 
independent.  There may also be uncertainty as to whether she would be able to 
distinguish between the different levels of desire.   
 
In response to these criticisms the relational version of this approach attempts to provide 
a better account of the problem of socialisation, recognising that oppressive 
socialisation could result in the first order desires being a more accurate  indicator of 
what the individual wants and values, the higher level values being a product of the 
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socialisation.83  Marilyn Friedman proposes a model which is non-hierarchical: a two-
way process which aims to integrate intermediate standards and motivations and the 
individual’s highest principles.84  However, a threat to autonomy is perceived only 
when total internalisation of socialisation which acts to inhibit autonomy is either not 
entirely successful or has started to fail.  This alternative approach is therefore subject to 
the same criticisms as the more traditional models of Frankfurt and Dworkin as a lack of 
disparity between the two standards will not necessarily signify autonomy.85  
 
Another criticism of the traditional procedural approach has been its ‘time-slice’ nature, 
where no account is taken of how a person’s wishes and values have evolved.  John 
Christman’s historical approach recognises the potential danger of manipulation and the 
internalisation of oppression, and requires that upon reflection the individual does not 
resist how the desire has developed.86  In addition, a lack of resistance should not be 
because of factors which inhibit self-reflection and should not involve self-deception.  
Christman explicitly demands that the process of reflection not be influenced by 
manipulation, indoctrination or oppressive socialisation as these would interfere with 
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normal cognitive reflective processes.87  But we might ask whether it is plausible or 
likely to assume that a person who has known only one way of thinking would be 
capable of identifying external influences, or disposed to challenge them as illegitimate.  
The individual would have to be self-transparent and be aware of how desires and 
preferences have been acquired. It seems that the ability to consider changing one’s 
identifications presupposes autonomy from the outset.88  Even if this is too harsh an 
observation, the bar is set in terms of the depth of awareness of one’s psychological 
history and of the ability to analyse in depth the motivations for each desire.89   
 
Diana Meyers’ competency theory, also relational, analyses the skills and capacities 
required for autonomy and the type of socialisation that is required to develop - rather 
than undermine - those skills. It is based on the concept that autonomy is a competency 
which consists of the skills of self-discovery, self-direction and self-definition, enabling 
reflection.90  Meyers contends that this self-realisation approach can be developed only 
in the context of social relationships, thus the social environment is central to the extent 
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of the capacities achieved.91  Meyers believes that a woman who has been subjected to 
oppressive socialisation may be particularly compromised in relation to programmatic 
autonomy, that is, the capacity to decide important life issues critically and 
reflectively.92 This demonstrates one of the criticisms of the relational autonomy 
approach as the existence of social oppression in a society may then lead to a conclusion 
that a woman living within that society cannot be autonomous.  On this point Paul 
Benson prefers to argue that despite the existence of social oppression, some women 
will still have sufficient self-awareness and information to prevent them from being 
entirely manipulated.  These women will have regard for their own competence and 
worth and so will be able to defend their decisions and answer for them.93  This would 
not automatically lead to the conclusion that a woman in an oppressive society has no 
autonomy.  Meyers agrees, proposing that not all preferences of an individual should be 
granted equal weight.  If the preference reflects uncritical acceptance of social norms 
and expectations then such a preference will warrant less recognition than decisions 
arising from the exercise of skills of self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction.  
We can note here that theoretically the focus is not on the content of the decision, but on 
how the woman has acquired the desire in question.  In practice, however, it will be the 
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content of the decision which prompts the concern and further scrutiny, as it is in the 
case of commercial surrogacy.  
 
In the light of these objections to procedural approaches, and particularly in relation to 
the problem identified with socialisation, some theorists hold the view that the 
procedural account should be supplemented by a non-neutral condition.  A strong 
substantive account requires an individual’s preference to contain specific content in 
order for it to be considered autonomous. There must be the capacity to identify the 
difference between right and wrong.  Oppressive socialisation may interfere with that 
capacity and those subjected to such may not be regarded as autonomous.  Susan Wolf 
is an advocate of the strong substantive account, requiring the individual to have the 
capacity for rational self-legislation.94  She describes this as a ‘special sort of sanity’.95  
The agent would have to have the ability to know what she is doing and also to know 
that what she is doing is right or wrong.  This clearly goes beyond the requirements for 
the procedural account, and requires ‘the ability to cognitively and normatively 
appreciate the world for what it is’.96  Wolf describes this as meaning ‘widespread inter-
subjective agreement’97 but this requires further analysis and also results in other 
concerns.  If this signifies that the individual’s preference will be measured by the 
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majority view (if indeed there is a majority view of commercial surrogacy), that other 
views about the world are incorrect and therefore that person does not possess this 
‘special sort of sanity’, then this hands the majority the power to decide on the sanity of 
others. It also allows them to judge whether or not the decision-makers are autonomous.  
The approach certainly responds to situations where oppressive socialisation may have 
resulted in preferences which are normatively questionable, but it may also then 
discount autonomy for all erroneous decisions and those which are the result of human 
weakness, as well as those made within an environment of subordination or 
oppression.98  This will unavoidably result in implied criticism of other cultures with 
little regard for the problems that attend the justification of substantive ethical claims 
thrown up by cultural pluralism or relativism. The more prescription that attends the 
content of a decision, the more we move away from the traditional concept of autonomy 
that values the ability to decide for oneself.   
 
A weak substantive account requires the decision-maker to hold certain attitudes in 
relation to herself - such as self-trust, self-confidence and self-esteem - and this is more 
in line with the emphasis on the societal orientation of relational theories given that 
these attributes often depend on social conditions and relations. This may be too 
burdensome, however, for those who are socially oppressed, given that such character 
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traits do not flourish in environments which erode self-worth and self-esteem.  This 
becomes apparent in Robin Dillon’s support for the weak substantive account which 
maintains that a feminist conception of self-respect would be more favourable to 
liberalisation.99 Dillon focuses on Stephen Darwall’s ‘recognition self-respect’100 and it 
being required for a person to be able to develop and make choices. This means 
recognising that persons have intrinsic moral worth and status and that as a member of 
the moral community the individual possesses basic moral rights.101 However, any 
institutionalised denial of the equality of women would make ‘recognition self-respect’ 
difficult to achieve, leading to a presumption that women living within such an 
environment will be non-autonomous.  This idea of self-respect is relational as it 
recognises that connections to others are part of what makes us an individual, but it may 
then act against those women who have had a low status imposed on them by society. 
Similarly, Trudy Govier emphasises the value of self-trust, requiring the individual to 
be secure in the sense of her own values, motives and capacities to facilitate reflection 
and effective action.102 Andrea Westlund’s dialogical conception also asks the agent to 
take responsibility for herself, and to subject herself to independent self-criticism, to 
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hold herself answerable.103 All of these approaches attempt to address directly the effect 
of social oppression but the requirement of such attributes as a criterion of autonomy 
appears onerous. Although intended to provide a supportive critique of women living 
within an oppressive environment, the very account of the oppressive circumstances 
might preclude a finding of autonomy.   
 
Natalie Stoljar’s relational version of a strong substantive approach to autonomy relies 
on the intuition that if a preference is directly produced by the internalisation of 
oppressive norms then even when those attitudes have been reflectively endorsed by the 
decision-maker she will be unable to produce autonomous action.104  It is not then the 
content of the preference which goes to the heart of this approach but the motivation 
behind the preference and whether this motivation is the woman’s own. But feminist 
intuitions should not endorse a presumption of non-autonomy, rather they should trigger 
further inquiry.  Stoljar’s approach satisfies one intuition, namely, that the woman’s 
choice cannot be her own if it is based on norms promulgated by others, but it will 
rarely lead to an acknowledgement of autonomy for women who appear to be acting in 
accordance with those norms.  
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These competing theories have similar aims, but not one alone adequately addresses the 
concerns related to the internalisation of oppression.  A more holistic approach has been 
taken by Catriona Mackenzie who identifies distinct dimensions of autonomy and how 
they are causally interdependent.105   The three dimensions are self-determination, self-
governance and self-authorisation. Her novel approach aims to give the necessary 
weight to the social and political preconditions for autonomy and may also satisfy both 
intuitions.  It addresses the possible effect of internalisation of oppression and also 
recognises that a person could, nevertheless, be self-governing and self-authorising even 
when living under oppression.  Further, a person could have the freedom she requires 
for self-determination but may not be self-governing or self-authorising.   
 
The relational self-determination dimension requires the agent to have the freedom and 
opportunity to make choices which are referred to as ‘opportunity conditions’. External 
constraints may take away the ability to control one’s life and this will inevitably 
undermine autonomy. Mackenzie believes that the opportunity conditions for self-
determination are best described in the ‘capability’ account of Martha Nussbaum. These 
capabilities  include being able to live a life of normal length, being able to have good 
health, including reproductive health, being able to move freely and have a choice in 
                                                     
105 Catriona Mackenzie, ‘Three Dimensions of Autonomy: A Relational Analysis’ in Andrea 
Veltman and Mark Piper (eds), Autonomy, Oppression and Gender (Oxford University Press 
2014), pp 15-41 
 
37 
 
matters of reproduction, being able to use the senses, imagination and thought, being 
able to have attachment to things and people, being able to form a conception of the 
good, affiliation, being able to live with other species, being able to laugh and play and 
having control over one’s environment, both politically and materially.106 If the 
internalisation of oppression leads to a choice not to have one of the capabilities on the 
list, evidenced by a suspected adaptive preference, then the external constraints may 
have affected the conditions required for self-governance (authenticity and competency) 
and for self-authorisation.   
 
Relational self-governance focuses on the internal conditions of competence and 
authenticity, but recognises at the same time that external conditions will influence the 
development of skills and competencies needed to govern the self.  Here Mackenzie 
uses John Christman’s approach to authenticity which accepts that a person’s identity 
develops over time and is historically sensitive.107 Competence conditions refer to the 
skills a person needs to be self–governing and the importance of social influence is 
recognised again, as well as the need to promote relationships which will assist with 
self-knowledge.   
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For relational self-authorisation a person must regard herself as having the normative 
authority to be self-determining and self-governing.  This dimension clearly draws on 
the work of those who have promoted the weak substantive relational theories of 
autonomy such as Dillon, Govier and Westlund who require the individual to have self-
respect, self-trust and self-esteem.  These self-evaluative stances will depend on inter-
subjective social relations, creating a vulnerability on the part of the person who is not 
granted recognition by others when there is an inequality of power.108  Because of the 
emphasis on how others regard the individual, this account grants too much influence to 
external factors in determining the presence or absence of autonomy.  Mackenzie 
attempts to soften this externalism by rejecting the ‘all or nothing’ approach and 
stipulating only that a person has appropriate self-evaluative attitudes which will 
depend on the context of the decision to be made. This three dimensional approach may 
be more comprehensive and attempts to address the criticisms of each single relational 
theory of autonomy but with that comes complexity and an uncertainty as to how these 
different dimensions may be applied as well as the weight to be given to each one.  It 
may yet be asking too much of an oppressed woman to be able to satisfy each 
dimension and so achieve autonomy. Much depends on Mackenzie’s interpretation of 
‘appropriate’ self-evaluative attitudes and how each dimension is applied to the decision 
to act as a commercial surrogate.  
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It is submitted that no theory of autonomy can lead us to definite conclusions as to the 
presence or absence of autonomy.  What theory can do is show us that there is the 
possibility of the presence of autonomy, even in a patriarchal, oppressive, environment.  
But how are we to theorise the overwhelming issue of exploitation, the existence of 
which cannot plausibly be denied? We have argued that oppression does not eradicate 
autonomy, but does finding a place for autonomy in oppression mean that we must 
concede that autonomy precludes exploitation?  
 
The existence of exploitation in the context of an autonomous decision 
 
If we conclude that the Indian woman choosing to act as a commercial surrogate may be 
autonomous then this empowers her as we recognise her as an autonomous being rather 
than dismiss her as non-autonomous because of her oppressive environment.   This 
avoids any charge of paternalism, one of the main concerns of Western feminists in 
particular.  However, there is a danger, identified by Heather Widdows, that if we 
merely focus on respect for autonomy then we underplay the possibility of 
exploitation.109    Certainly it is important to determine whether or not a decision is 
supportable on the basis of autonomy but that is not the golden key which transforms an 
                                                     
109 Heather Widdows, ‘Border disputes across bodies: Exploitation in trafficking for prostitution 
and egg sale for stem cell research’ International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 
Vol. 2, No. 1, (2009), pp 5-24 
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act or a service into one which is not exploitative, so absolving those benefiting from an 
act or service from charges of exploitation.  If we argue that there can be autonomy but 
still exploitation then we need to explore further what we understand as exploitation. 
 
Exploitation is treating a person as a means to an end.  The Indian surrogate is used as a 
commodity to benefit others: her family, the medical profession and the commissioning 
couples. Even the state benefits from the income generated by this form of medical 
tourism.  
 
Exploitation is treating another unfairly and taking advantage of the other’s situation.  
There are such signs in reports of ‘baby farms’ in certain States, surrogates not 
understanding the contracts they are signing, and not being paid a sufficient share of the 
amount the commissioning couple are charged.110  The family of the surrogate use the 
gender subordination within the patriarchal system to persuade the women to trade their 
bodies, their labour and even body parts in exchange for much needed income. They are 
often desperate, illiterate and unaware of the associated risks.  They may still be 
autonomous, even if their agreement to the procedure is solely because they desperately 
need the money to survive, or to feed their families.  Surrogacy may be a way to escape 
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from abusive husbands or may be a way to survive following divorce.111 It could then 
be argued that the practice of surrogacy will, for these women in particular, increase 
their chance of an autonomous life.  But even if she is autonomous and will benefit from 
her decision she may be exploited nevertheless. She is still being treated unfairly.    
 
Anne Donchin’s view of exploitation is concerned about an individual’s surrounding 
social conditions and how these affect choices.112     She cites Onora O’Neill: 
 
This is not to say that (the) impoverished are irrational or wholly dependent or 
cannot consent.  However, their effective capacities and their opportunities for 
action ... constrain their possibilities for refusal and negotiation.113 
 
Donchin accepts that impecunious women in poor economies choose to sell their bodily 
resources rather than remain in poverty but believes that the consent of those women 
cannot turn a morally unacceptable offer into a morally fair purchase.114 Again, the 
consent is accepted as evidence of autonomy but the criticism is of the exploitation of 
the vulnerabilities of those who have to make such choices in order to survive.  It is then 
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the imbalance of power between the buyer and seller which leads to a conclusion of 
exploitation.   
 
This will occur in many areas of life, but it may be that there are certain arenas where 
the exploitation is considered more heinous than others.  A comparison could be made 
with the sale of organs where there are also claims of exploitation of the poor by those 
who are wealthier and in a position to purchase organs.  James Stacey Taylor examines 
the arguments of Paul Hughes and T.Z. Zutlevics who claim that the option to sell an 
organ is an autonomy-undermining ‘constraining option’.115 They submit that such an 
option in a person’s choice set is likely to undermine that person’s autonomy rather than 
enhance it.  Taylor disagrees and states that to allow a market in human organs would 
enhance vendor autonomy rather than diminish it.   This again links exploitation to the 
quality of autonomy, however, and does not address the possibility of exploitation even 
when autonomy is present.  Taylor points out that there are many areas of work which 
are regarded as exploitative but they are regulated to protect those working in those 
areas, rather than banned.  There are clearly different forms of exploitation, one of 
which would be to take advantage of others’ limited life choices, but another would be 
to not provide protection which may be costly but which would improve the quality of 
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the option set available to certain workers.116 This last point is persuasive when applied 
to the practice of commercial surrogacy and is developed further in the last section of 
this paper.   
 
Heather Widdows questions whether it is merely the inequality of bargaining power and 
unjust remuneration which constitutes exploitation or, in the case of any form of sale 
relating to bodies and body parts it is more the affront to human dignity that is inherent 
in such a service, and the consequent harm to a person’s self-worth.117  Although 
Widdows’ article concerns trafficking for prostitution, and the sale of eggs for stem cell 
research, her arguments could be relevant to commercial surrogacy.  Yet a distinction 
may be made between prostitution which seems to be intrinsically exploitative and 
degrading and commercial surrogacy which may not be exploitative if certain 
conditions and protections are in place to respect the woman’s dignity and to recognise 
the essence of her role in producing the much-wanted child.  It is submitted that 
prostitution would remain exploitative even if sufficient protection was given to the 
woman and she was paid a fair remuneration.   
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Certainly there may be an undermining of autonomy when there is a narrow choice base 
and an inequality in bargaining power, but if sufficient safeguards are put in place then 
the exploitative conditions will be reduced and autonomy can be helped to flourish.   
 
The final section of the paper examines what could convert an exploitative practice to 
one which better respects those who choose to embark upon it, whatever their reasons 
for doing so.  
 
Alternatives to the current proposed Bill 
 
A ban on commercial surrogacy could be an inappropriate solution in that it could 
eliminate one form of exploitation, merely to replace it with others: women could be 
coerced into helping family members to produce an heir or even be trafficked as 
surrogates.  Paradoxically, it could even be seen to curtail the woman’s autonomy by 
doing so as it limits her choices.118 An alternative solution would allow women to be 
able to make the decision to act as a surrogate but would protect them, as well as the 
commissioning couple, and the child which is the product of the surrogacy.   
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Many have proposed an international agreement to provide consistency in surrogacy 
laws across different countries but the differences in approaches to the practice of 
surrogacy mean that there is unlikely to be a consensus as to the standards to be set. 119   
Work on achieving private international law rules relating to the status of children and 
other issues which arise from international surrogacy arrangements is on-going but the 
most recent report from the Meeting of the Experts’ Groups on Parentage/Surrogacy 
indicated that no conclusions had been reached to date, due to the complexity of the 
subject and the different approaches by the States.120    If such an agreement is unlikely 
to materialise for some time, then vulnerable commercial surrogates only have their 
own government to protect them.  In this respect the Indian government have failed the 
surrogate.  The lack of regulation is exploitative.   
 
Damelio and Sorensen argue that the right sort of surrogacy contracts could enhance 
and extend freedom.121  Tighter regulation, including contracts which are more 
beneficial to the surrogate, would allow the practice of commercial surrogacy to 
continue, but would also go some way to alleviating the fears of exploitation of these 
women.  The surrogate should be entitled to care during the pregnancy but also 
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afterwards, and could also be given a fairer percentage of the fees the commissioning 
couple pay to clinics or agents and brokers. Financial payments should be paid securely 
to the surrogate to avoid others taking advantage of her earnings.  
 
Although the woman may be acting autonomously there is no indication that there is a 
respect for her autonomy at each stage of the surrogacy arrangement or related 
treatment.  The requirement of a valid consent would respect the woman as an 
autonomous being and should therefore be central to the provision of treatment. The 
woman should have the capacity to make the particular decision, should have received 
sufficient information to make an informed decision and should make the decision 
voluntarily.  At present there is considerable variation in the amount of information 
given to patients, still signs of paternalism in the doctor-patient relationship and often it 
is family members or the wider community who are making the decision on behalf of 
the woman.122 
 
Damelio and Sorensen hold that women are wronged by a prohibition because that 
interferes with the woman’s personal decision regarding what she wishes to do with her 
body.  However, to legalise commercial surrogacy without more protection for those 
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involved also wrongs women because of their unique vulnerability.  This proposed third 
way of allowing commercial surrogacy but with adequate safeguards in place is a ‘legal 
tool that honours and expands autonomy’.123 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article demonstrates that an assumption of adaptive preference formation and a 
consequent absence of autonomy when an Indian woman is choosing to act as a 
commercial surrogate, may be incorrect. She may have her own reasons for her 
preference, even if for others it is an unfamiliar form of flourishing.  She may be 
autonomous even if the influences are related to her constrained opportunities.  To 
legislate based on those presumptions would therefore be ill advised. Yet the 
accusations of exploitation have substance.   
 
Certainly, in an ideal world there would be alternatives to surrogacy for these women to 
earn a living but the reality is that the service of surrogacy provides them with an 
income which can help them to improve not only their own lives but also those of their 
family.  To deprive them of that opportunity may relieve international consciences but 
does not help them practically unless other conditions also change.   
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Although regulation of surrogacy in India is to be welcomed, given the uncertainty 
which prevails regarding the rights of all those involved in a surrogacy arrangement, 
this blanket ban on commercial surrogacy in the 2016 Bill is an inadequate reaction to 
criticism from the international community.  It may lead to an underground market 
being created and would place the surrogate in more danger.124 The monitoring of 
surrogacy and regulation of the practice which prioritises the mother as well as the child 
could be a better way to protect the surrogate from exploitation.  
 
The proposed legislation may, as it stands, do more harm than good.125  The current 
exploitation should be addressed, certainly, but not at the expense of personal choice.     
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